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STUDENT NOTES
DEms-DEL mvERY iN EscRow.-A executed a deed to his second
wife for the farm on which, they lived, and delivered it to X with instructions to deliver it to his wife after his death. The deed provided
that A should retain exclusive control over the premises during is
natural life, including the right to remove and sell timber, and further
provided that it should become void if the wife abandoned him or
died before he did. After A's death the deed was delivered to the
wife who had it recorded. An action was then brought by A's children
by a former marriage on the ground of non-delivery. The circuit
court dismissed the plaintiffs petition, and this action was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. The court held that the delivery in escrow
vested the estate in the grantee subject to the life estate in the grantor,
and subject to defeat by the condition in the deed. Burchette v.
Burchette, 237 Ky. 411, 35 S. W (2) 557 (1931).
Where the owner of land delivers a deed to a third person with
Instructions to deliver it to the grantee upon the latter's death, intending at the time of the delivery, to part forever with all right or power
thereafter to repossess -or recall it, such delivery is effectual and valid,
and upon the death of the grantor, the grantee may if necessary then
compel delivery. Burgess v. Fowler, 200 Ala. 196, 75 So. 954 (1917),
Green v. Skznner, 185 Cal. 435, 197 Pac. 60 (1921), Kyle v. Kyle, 175 Ia.
734, 157 N. W 248 (1916), Wilson v. Bridgelorth, 108 Miss. 199, 66 So.
524 (1914), Thrush v. Thrush, 63 Ore. 143, 125 Pac. 267 (1912), Kelber
v. Stesnafel, 190 Wis. 468, 209 N. W 595 (1926).
Such delivery will not be effectual unless it is made in such a way
that the grantor parts with all control over the instrument. The intent
of the grantee as in the case of a delivery generally [Ball v. Sandlin,
176 Ky. 537, 195 S. W 1089 (1917)], is the controlling factor in these
cases. Smith v. Smith, 173 Cal. 725, 161 Pac. 495 (1916), Rezgel v.
Reigel, 243 Ill. 623, 90 N. E. 1108 (1910). Thus if A signs and seals a
deed in favor of B, but keeps it in his desk with nothing more than the
idea that he may at some future time deliver it here is clearly no deed.
The situation is unchanged if he puts it in the hands of a third person
to keep for him. Barlow v. Hinton, 8 Ky. (1 A. K. Mar.) 97 (1817).
As long as -the deed is in the hands of the depositary subject to be recalled at any time, the grantee has no right to it and can acquire none.
If the grantor dies without parting with control over the deed it has
not been delivered during his life time, and after his decease no one
can have power to deliver it. Kirby v. Hulette, 174 Ky. 27, 192 S. W
62 (1917), Miller v. Sears, 91 Cal. 282, 27 Pac. 589 (1891)
Hoy v.
Adrazn College, 83 Ill. 267 (1876), Tarwater v. Going, 140 Ala. 273
(1904). If it is the intention of the grantor that title shall not pass
until after the death of the grantor the transaction partakes of the
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character of a testamentary disposition, regardless of its name, and
Is valid only when executed in the form and manner provided by law
for the execution of a last will and testament. Piclins v. Merran, 274
Fed. 1 (1921), Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917), Baxter v. Chapman, 147 Ga. 438, 94 S. E. 544 (1917), Veir v. Han, 301
Ill. 422, 134 N. E. 52 (1922), Smith v. Thayer, 234 Mass. 214, 125 N. E.
171 (1919), Weber v. Schaffer, 236 Mich. 345, 210 N. W 248; Singleton
v. Kelley, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63 (1922).
Not infrequently a deed delivered in this manner has been termed
an "escrow" This is inaccurate. In the words of Chief Justice Shaw
in the case of Foster v. Mansfield, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 415 (1841), "Where
the future delivery is to depend upon the payment of money or the
performance of some other condition it will be deemed an 'escrow'
Where it is merely to await the lapse of time, or the happening of some
contingency, and not the performance of some condition it will be
deemed the grantor's deed presently."
This rule, which seems to be the proper one, is applied in a great
number of jurisdictions, leaving the grantor a life estate in the property conveyed, and the third party is constituted the trustee, as
respects, the deed, for the grantee. Gideon v. Gideon, 99 Kan. 332, 161
Pac. 595 (1916), Dickinson v. Miller, 124 Minn. 346, 145 N. W 112
(1914), Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 162 Pac. 639 (1917),.Maxwell v.
Harper, 51 Wash, 351, 98 Pac. 756 (1909), Wheeler v. Loesh, 51 Ind.
App. 562, 99 N. E. 502 (1912), Meech v. Wilder, 130 Mich. 29, 89 N. W
556 (1902).
Upon just what theory the court proceeds to give the grantor a
life estate unless it is clearly expressed in the deed is not made clear.
If 'this means that a conveyance so delivered creates two estates, a
particular estate for life in the grantor, and an estate in the nature
of a remainder or a reversion in the grantee, the propriety of the statement appears to be somewhat open to question. Thus to give to a conveyance, in terms creating only an estate in fee simple, the additional
effect of creating an estate for life in the grantor, does considerable
violence to its language, and furthermore, it gives to the matter of
delivery an operation to which it is not entitled. The function of delivery is to determine whether the instrument shall be operative, not
the estate or estates which the instrument shall create. However, the
result may perhaps be reached upon the theory of a resulting use
which would give to the grantor a legal life estate; or, which would
seem perfectly sound, the courts may simply mean that since the deed
is in the hands of a third party until the grantor's death, there is no
one who can disturb the grantor's possession of the land, and that
consequently he has what is substantially as good as a life estate. Perhaps with the further implication that should the grantee, prior to
the death of the grantor, obtain possession of the land, a court of
equity at least, would protect the grantor in the enjoyment of the
premises. 2 Tiff. R. P 462; 26 Har. L. Rev 565.

K. L. J.-7

92

K

INTUcKY LAw JOURiL

Other courts, however, have held that no title passes until the
death of the grantor, and then the title is by "relation" deemed to
have vested as of the time of the first delivery. Wickland v. Lindquest,
102 Minn. 321, 113 N. W 631 (1907), Sneathen v. Sneathen, 104 Mo.
201 (1891), Henry v. Phillips,105 Tex. 459 (1912), Williams v. Latham,
113 Mo. 165 (1892), Mohr v. Joslen, 162 Ia. 34, 142' N. W 981 (1913),
Hargette v. Hargette, 201 Ala. 511, 78 So. 865 (1918). Often in the
samq jurisdiction a court has wavered from one to the other of these
theories. (See footnote to 26 Har. L. Rev. 579.)
If we direct our attention not to the language of the courts, but
to the result that they reach the difference between these two groups
of decisions largely disappears. If the contest is between the heir of
the grantor and the grantee the only question is whether the grantee
has title. When he got it is of little difference. However, if a third
person claims a right derived from the grantor between the time of the
first and second delivery the need for an exact delimitation of the
rights of the parties becomes imperative. If the court goes on the first
theory, that the grantee has only a life estate, then any person claiming under the grantor whether as purchaser, creditor, or donee would
acquire no property right that could be asserted against the grantee
after the grantor's death, Brown v. Austin, 35 Barb. (N. Y.) 341
(1861), Whittenbrock v. Cass, 110 Cal. 1, 42 Pac. 300 (1895). If the
court applies the second theory it is found that such delivery is effective
against subsequent donees, grantees, and creditors (Gulley v. Atkins,
78 Conn. 380, 62 Atl. 337 (1905), Smiley v. Smiley, 114 Ind. 258, 16
N. E. 585 (1888), Rankin v. Donovan, 166 N. Y. 626, 60 N. E. 1119
(1901), except insofar as they stand in the position of innocent purchasers. If they stand in this position the grantee will lose (Rathmell
v. Shirley,-69 Ohio St. 187 (1905), Waldock v. Frsco Lbr Co., 71 Okl.
200, 176 Pac. 218 (1918), whether the interest be legal or equitable.
Kentucky has applied the first theory, holding that the first delivery vests a present interest in the grantee, subject to the life estate
of the grantor, the grantee's right of possession being thereby postponed. Mason's Guardian v. Soaper, 236 Ky. 525, 23 S. W (2d) 956
(1930), Haydon v. Easter, 15 Ky. L. R. 597, 24 S. W 626. Upon what
theory the life estate is given is not clear, but it is submitted that these
cases are correct as they undoubtedly achieve just the result the grantor
had in mind.
Where the grantor expressly reserves a life estate in the premises
it is held in Kentucky that this does not prevent the estate from immediately vesting in the grantee, with the right to possession thereby
postponed. Burchette v. Burchette (supra), lNuckels v. Stone, 120 Ky
631, 87 S. W 799 (1905), Mason's Guardianv. Soaper (dictum) (supra).
This is in accord with the weight of authority. Dickinson v. Dickinson,
322 Ill. 492, 153 N. E. 740 (1926), Lathrop v. Knoop, 210 N. W (Ia.)
746; Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 107 Okl. 140, 231 Pac. 237 (1924). These
cases are correct. The reservation of the life estate by the grantor is
meaningless unless he intended a present interest to vest in the
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grantee. The grantor by reserving the life estate in hmself necessarily
recognizes the grantee as the owner of the property subject to the life
estate. This construction of the deed is further borne out in the principal case by other clauses providing that the deed was to become
void if the wife abandoned her husband or died before he did.
In the principal case the grantor, by placing the conditions in the
deed, did not make a present grant in fee simple subject to the life
estate. It was a present grant of a fee simple conditional, subject to
being defeated by the happening of those conditions and this effect was
apparently the grantor's intention.
KlN-rrn A. HowE.
HOMIOmE Im DErENsE oF PRoPERTY.-The laws of all civilized
countries have recognized, as an incident to the right to acquire and
own property, that the owner has the right to defend and protect his
property against any aggressor and if he commits an assault in so
doing the law will justify him.
Such force may be used by a person as may appear to him to be
reasonably necessary, in the defense of his personal or real property,
or to prevent another from taking the possession away from him, but
this defense must not be carried sofar as the killing of the aggressor
for the mere protection of his property, unless he is in possession and
the killing would be necessary to prevent the commission of a felony.
A homicide will not be justified by the mere fact that the property is
being wrongfully taken or detained. Chiapman v. Commonwealth, 12
K. L. R. 704, 15 S. W 50 (1891), Trusty v. Commonwealth, 12 K. L. R.
706, 41 S. W 766 (1897), Stacy v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky 402, 225
S. W 37 (1920), State v. Johnson, 12 Ala. 840 (1848). The underlying
principle behind this line of decisions is that the preservation of
human life is more important to society than the preservation or protection of property. The law may afford ample compensation for the
loss of property, but utterly fails to do so for the loss of a human life.
Story v. State, 71 Ala. 329 (1882).
If the trespass upon the person or property of another amounts to
a felony, the killing of the trespasser will be justifiable homicide if it
was necessary in order to prevent the commission of a felony. A killing will not be justified by a trespass that amounts only to a misdemeanor. Crawford v. State. 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214 (1895). A trespasser may be prevented from carrying away property by the use of no
more force than is actually necessary for that purpose, this degree of
force cannot be carried to the extent of inflicting great bodily harm or
the taking of life. The owner will only be justified in the use of sufficient force to prevent the trespass, destruction, or the carrying away
of his property. The retention of property will not be allowed when
it is necessary to sacrifice human life in order to retain the possession
of the property. If the owner of the property is assaulted by the
wrong-doer, where the owner is attempting to prevent the trespass or
taking of his property, the owner may wound or kill, if necessary, in

